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theoretical lens of structural realist international relations theory.

This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss3/6

Rumsey: The 2011 MENA Revolutions: A Study in U.S. Energy (In)Security

Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 5 Issue 3 2012, pp. 33-50
DOI: 10.5038/1944-0472.5.3.3

The 2011 MENA Revolutions: A
Study in U.S. Energy (In)Security
Jessie Rumsey
Kent State University

Abstract
The recent upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have
brought into stark relief the conflict between democratic values and strategic interests in U.S. foreign policy. Americans are known for commitment to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, yet the U.S.
Government is frequently unwilling to step forward and openly express
even rhetorical support for reform movements in foreign countries. In
fact, initial American reluctance to support the recent "Arab Spring"
uprisings serves as another example of what scholars argue is a general
exception in the MENA to broader post-Cold War rising costs of maintaining autocracy. This article explores the American response to the
recent MENA uprisings and their significance in terms of U.S. fossil fuel
energy security using the theoretical lens of structural realist international relations theory.

Introduction
We will lay the foundation for our future capacity to meet America's
energy needs from America's own resources.
—Richard Nixon, 1974
A massive program must be initiated to increase energy supply …to
achieve the independence we want.
—Gerald Ford, 1975
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This intolerable dependence on foreign oil threatens our economic independence and the very security of our Nation.
—Jimmy Carter, 1979
We will continue supportive research leading to the development of new
technologies and more independence of foreign oil.
—Ronald Reagan, 1981
There is no security for the United States in further dependence on
foreign oil.
—George H.W. Bush, 1988
For decades we have known the days of cheap and easily accessible oil
were numbered.
—Barack Obama, 20101
The recent upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have
brought to light, once again, the conflict between traditional American
values and the overarching goals of American foreign policy.2 Citizens of
the United States are renowned for their commitment to universal liberties, freedom from oppression, and human rights for all, yet the U.S. Government has been frequently unwilling to step forward and openly
express even rhetorical support for reform movements in foreign countries. Why is this so? More specifically, why, even after the initial shock of
having been caught off-guard by Tunisian and Egyptian reform movements faded, did President Barack Obama appear so unwilling to express
support for the revolutionaries in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) in early 2011? As the revolutions gained momentum, instead of
expressing solidarity with the protestors, Obama's spokesman refused to
be drawn on whether or not the administration continued to back Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. In an attempt to side-step the inquiry, he
referred instead to the country of Egypt as a "strong ally"—from which
many inferred that the United States continued to stand with the autocrat.
Not until after Mubarak had already dissolved his government did Secretary of State Clinton call for an "orderly transition" of power in Egypt.
Meanwhile, President Obama waited until the eighth day of protests
before urging a "meaningful" and "peaceful" power transition—by which
point it was already evident that Mubarak had lost the battle for control of
his country.3
In fact, this ambivalence is not a recent development. It is, though, a particularly salient example of what scholars argue is a general exception in
the MENA to the post-Cold War phenomenon of rising costs being associ34
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ated with the maintenance of openly autocratic regimes.4 Authoritarian
resilience specialists have successfully produced research demonstrating
that Western support plays a role in maintaining the stability of authoritarian control in the Middle East and North Africa. This support takes the
form of both material resources and international legitimacy.5 At times,
both the European Union and the United States have been criticized for
their lack of commitment to the MENA democratization process. It is this
evident lack of commitment that was on display during the beginning of
2011.
It would appear that encouraging others to fight for the same freedoms
Americans enjoy is not the priority that the U.S. Government sometimes
makes it out to be.6 But if promoting the ideal of liberal democracy does
not take precedence, what does? If liberal international relations theory
fails to explain the words and deeds (or lack thereof) of the American
Government in this situation, what overarching theoretical explanation
can we find? Following a brief overview of U.S. energy security policy literature, I will address the recent MENA upheaval. This will be followed by
a concise examination of U.S.-MENA energy relations. It will become
clear that the importance of the MENA to U.S. energy security poses a
complicated issue to be taken into account when considering democracy
movements in the area, particularly with regard to potential regime
changes. I will then argue that realism provides the best theoretical explanation for U.S. reluctance to take a clear, pro-revolution policy stance
concerning the recent North African uprisings. My focus is slightly more
concentrated on North Africa because although reform movements were
launched throughout the MENA, the most successful efforts have been
limited to the North African nations of Egypt and Tunisia; Yemeni protestors succeeded in unseating President Ali Abdullah Saleh, but the
country is still experiencing chaos. Meanwhile, revolutionary attempts in
Bahrain and Syria, and mild unrest in Saudi Arabia, have thus far proven
notably unsuccessful. In closing, I will suggest key avenues for future
research.

Energy Policy in the Literature: U.S. Insecurity
The United States is the world's third largest producer of crude oil (5.7
million barrels per day, with an additional 4.6 million barrels per day in
petroleum gains) but is the world's largest consumer (18.8 million barrels
per day).7 More problematically for the long term, "the United States consumes 25% of the world's oil, while possessing only 3% of the world's oil
reserves."8 A topic of Presidential rhetoric spanning eight administrations, fossil fuel energy security has never failed to capture attention in
35
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one way or another (starting with Nixon in 1974 and continuing through
the Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W.
Bush Administrations to the present day.9 Beginning with Nixon's desire
to decrease dependency on foreign resources and most recently making
headlines with Obama's warning that "cheap and easily accessible oil" is
on the way out, the issue of energy security has served as both a political
rallying call and a liability throughout the years. Notwithstanding charges
of being "abstract, elusive, vague, inherently difficult and blurred" in
nature, this subject has also grown increasingly salient in academic literature over the past decade.10 In fact, Haass attributes the decline of unipolarity in large part to United States energy policy. He argues that high
levels of U.S. oil consumption and imports funnel financial resources to
producer regions. Such financial capital would be better devoted to seeking to reduce the influence wielded by fossil-fuel net exporters by increasing our own energy independence and investing in sustainability.11
One of many explanations for the lack of real policy movement on the
issue of foreign oil is that since economic assessments of the effects of
energy security are generally vague and nebulous, policymakers frequently lack guidance for effective policy creation and implementation. In
an effort to mitigate this problem, Lefèvre uses an alternative approach
which delineates between the price and physical availability factors on
energy security. Lefèvre's findings, based on European case studies,
reveal that oil market resource concentration is an important factor in the
rise of the price component of energy security.12 This underlines the
importance of the emphasis Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz place on securing stability in regions of oil resource concentration.13
Brown and Huntington note that increasing U.S. oil imports instead of
trying to increase U.S. oil production expands the share of our energy
supply derived from unstable regions, thus exacerbating oil price
shocks.14 However, as a fungible resource in the integrated global oil market, any upsurge in U.S. oil consumption (whether from domestic production or imports) can aggravate economic losses related to oil supply
disruptions. In an investigation of externalities quantifiable as "oil security premiums" (economic losses connected to disturbances in oil supplies), the authors found that estimated oil security premiums are actually
relatively modest compared to projected increases in oil price itself. The
study by Brown and Huntington, as well as individual work by Brown,
stresses that oil consumption makes the United States vulnerable to security externalities such as those described above, but that such economic
concerns remain secondary to matters more directly related to the secu-
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rity of energy supply.15 These concerns include resource concentration
outside the United States and the causes for current fluctuations in oil
prices (such as government instability in producer regions).
Perceived threats to energy supplies are becoming increasingly salient in
the energy security debate. Although in recent years leading industrial
countries have integrated climate change concerns into their policy agendas, security of fossil fuel energy supply remains paramount; the United
States consumes approximately two-three times the amount of its annual
crude oil production. An ever-relevant concern in the United States, the
attention devoted to energy security issues continues to grow at an
unprecedented rate.16 Perceived or actual vulnerabilities, due to excessive
reliance on particular sources or suppliers of energy, have led to the rise
of policies designed to diversify energy supplies. Such policies include the
expansion of U.S. oil company investment in Algeria, the creation of giant
wind farms in Texas, and exploration of U.S. natural gas reserves in shale
formations.17 However, although seen as more stable than some of its
neighbors, Algeria remains vulnerable to the spread of regional unrest
(see following "Jasmine in Bloom" section); domestic alternative energy
production remains a nascent industry; and U.S. natural gas reserves
have yet to be fully investigated. Despite favorable estimates of shale gas
resources, uncertainty remains because the industry possesses the ability
to fully predict neither "how resources in the ground translate into future
yields" nor the true ecological repercussions of various extraction methods, including controversial hydraulic fracturing.18 For the short term at
least, U.S. energy needs continue to rely heavily on oil and on the MENA.
Even oil-producing states in the region from which the United States does
not directly import oil can affect international prices by limiting the supply of oil (in 2010, national oil companies controlled approximately 55%
of current production and 85% of proven reserves).19
Lacher and Kumetat recently dispelled illusions of excessive risk on the
part of European nations investing in North Africa.20 However, their
review neglected to consider the potential effects of mass reform movements. "Insurgency" was considered as a subcategory of "terrorism," but
this is hardly comparable to largely peaceful mass protest and overthrowing of government. Lacher and Kumetat's article is also more geographically narrow in focus than this study, as they limit their investigation to
North Africa. This paper then builds on their work by considering the
effects of the current unrest in the MENA and gauging the potential consequences for U.S. energy security.
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Jasmine in Bloom: The 2011 MENA Revolutions
The 2011 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa have garnered the
appellations "Jasmine Revolution(s)" and "Arab Spring." The "Jasmine
Revolution" label originally referred to the rise to power of President Zine
El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia in 1987. Media organizations, particularly
those of Western origin, resurrected it recently to refer to the 2010–2011
unrest. The Tunisian protest movement then spread throughout the
Middle East and North Africa, taking the phrase "Jasmine Revolution"
with it. However, many demonstrators prefer to refer to the movements
by country name, or cities where early protests broke out. The term "Arab
Spring" has also been spread by the media, particularly Western media
organizations. This, and phrases like "Arab Awakening," indicate a newly
pro-revolution, pro-Arab attitude, which challenges formerly shallow
Western media portrayals of the region. These appellations for the MENA
demonstrations and protest movements may be used interchangeably
without real differentiation in meaning.21
Demonstrations originated in Tunisia, following the December 17, 2010
self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, a jobless graduate protesting the
confiscation of his fruit and vegetables by the police. The continuation of
protests following this initial expression of anger in Tunisia, considered a
stable nation in the region, surprised many observers. By January 9,
between eleven and twenty deaths had been reported, following clashes
between protestors and police. Riots broke out as demonstrators attacked
public offices and burned cars. Two days earlier, rioting had taken place
in neighboring Algeria over sharp increases in food prices. Although
police dealt harshly with demonstrators, using teargas and batons, Algerian Trade Minister Mustapha Benbada promised imminent price reductions in edible staples, hoping this would mitigate the situation.22
Demonstrators refused to be suppressed in Tunisia. The uprising gained
such strength that on January 14 Tunisian president Zine al-Abidine Ben
Ali fled to Saudi Arabia. By this time the death toll had reached an estimated 200 people. U.S. President Barack Obama, apparently caught offguard by the success of the Tunisian revolution, delivered a post-hoc
statement lauding the "courage and dignity of the Tunisian people."23
Algerian rioting also continued, although without marked success. Two
Algerian men apparently set themselves on fire during this time span in
what appeared to be copy-cat suicide attempts of the Tunisian December
self-immolation that first sparked regional protests. Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi condemned the Tunisian revolution, while concern mounted
among regional and Western leaders about the possibility of a domino
effect in the MENA. On January 17, a man in Cairo set himself on fire,
38
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apparently in protest against economic conditions. Near the end of the
month, Yemen also made headlines as demonstrations, initially inspired
by Tunisia then by the arrest of a well-known female Islamic activist,
became more impassioned. Riot police used water cannons to disperse
protestors; President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to defuse tensions by
raising salaries of state employees, halving income taxes, and ordering his
ministers to control prices.24
Also, during the end of January, unrest spread to Amman, Jordan. Demonstrators demanded political and economic reform. However, during the
last six days of January, Western media attention was fixated on mass
demonstrations in Egypt. Nationwide protests erupted with dissatisfied
citizens calling for the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. By February 1, Mubarak attempted to placate protestors by promising to step down
at the next election. This attempt failed, as did an effort to intimidate
demonstrators using regime-orchestrated mob violence. Demonstrations
also continued in Yemen, despite Saleh's offer to step down in 2013. The
first week of February saw continued mass demonstrations in Egypt, in
spite of renewed government efforts to wheel and deal its way out of the
trouble. Mubarak finally stepped down on February 11 after eighteen days
of mass protest. The following day, Algerian police beat back protestors in
Algiers. Protests also resumed in Yemen, and appeared in Bahrain and
Iran. Bahraini riot police fired teargas and rubber bullets at demonstrators during the first mass protests in a wealthy Gulf state. By the end of
February, protests and accompanying riots had spread to many cities in
Morocco, continued in Yemen and Egypt, reappeared in Tunisia, Bahrain,
and Jordan, and also appeared in Iraq.25
Region-wide protests, and Western attention to them, eased at the beginning of the month of March as Libya took over the headlines. Mid-March
saw Yemeni protests pick up pace once more; the banning of protests in
Saudi Arabia (following street demonstrations by minority Shia groups);
and Saudi support for the Bahraini regime in putting down protests that
had almost overwhelmed riot police. Algeria moved to stave off additional
unrest by providing pay raises to more government employees. Syrian
security forces killed protestors in Daraa, while Saleh began to lose his
grip on the Yemeni population. By March 21, eleven top Yemeni military
commanders had resigned. Confrontations in Jordan and Bahrain also
continued through the end of March. April saw continued unrest throughout MENA, with regime crackdowns and plainclothes security forces firing on civilians in Yemen; troops firing on and killing protestors in Syria;
a Jordanian man setting himself on fire; pressure from Egyptian protestors to prosecute Mubarak; and systematic attacks by Bahraini forces
against medical personnel assisting injured protestors. By the end of
39
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April, the Syrian Government had sent tanks and troops into towns and
villages in a massive crackdown; Yemeni ruler Saleh had promised to step
down, but protestors continued to demonstrate over what was seen as a
repugnant immunity deal negotiated with the Saudi-dominated Gulf
Cooperation Council.26
Over a year later, the protests have only resulted in the resignation of
three heads of state: Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of
Egypt, and after a much longer process, Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen.
Various other leaders have announced their intentions not to seek reelection after their current terms, including the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki. Jordanian protests did result in the resignation of the government, but the breadth and depth of reforms is debated; in May of 2012,
many observers feared the reform process had been stalled indefinitely.27
The Obama Administration's overall response to the MENA revolutions
has been remarkable for its underwhelming nature. Apparently caught
flatfooted by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions (and supporting the
semi-liberal regimes of "our guys"); seeming to try not to step on the
Saudi royals' toes with regard to the Saudi Arabian and Bahraini demonstrations; reluctant to criticize the King of Jordan; and failing to express
support or concern for the Syrian and Yemeni protestors until government crackdowns became extreme, the American Government has
appeared to be making more of an effort not to support the revolutions
than to express solidarity with the revolutionaries.28 The perennial U.S.
need for oil explains this reserve.

U.S. Energy Security: The MENA Connection
A number of causes can result in energy price fluctuation, including current energy supply and demand conditions, financial market conditions,
and expectations concerning future supply and demand. Due to the fungibility of oil, and the integration of global hydrocarbon markets, what
takes place in the MENA is of paramount concern to the United States.29
The North African region alone holds approximately 4.5% of the world's
oil and 4.4% of the world's proven gas reserves.30 Although the U.S. procures a greater amount of its oil from Canada than from anywhere else,
disruptions in the MENA both directly and indirectly affect U.S. oil
import capabilities. Direct effects include increased competition with
Europe (the largest hydrocarbon importer from the MENA area) for
MENA resources, while indirect effects include the destabilization of global hydrocarbon markets (e.g., through speculation).

40
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Once the protests began in Tunisia, Brent crude oil prices increased by
nearly $20 per barrel to $113 per barrel on March 8, 2011, at which point
unrest had spread through a number of MENA countries.31 (The price for
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude, the benchmark most often cited in
the United States, did not increase as dramatically due to a variety of factors, including greater integration between the market for Brent.) With
the launch of NATO Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya (on March 19),
prices rose even more dramatically to $125. While oil futures had already
been rising during the fourth quarter of 2010, largely as a result of the global economic recovery and accompanying increase in oil demand, unrest
in the MENA contributed to higher prices. This is because of threats to the
oil supply from and oil transportation through the region, as well as lower
production having resulted from the protests. Furthermore, there
remained concern (indeed, there remains concern, albeit now diminished) that more pronounced unrest may spread to the region's larger
producers.32
"The MENA region includes some of the world's largest oil exporting
countries and most important shipping chokepoints."33 In total, the
region's oil exports equal approximately 40% of global oil trade. Approximately 45% of the petroleum used in the United States is imported. 52%
of that comes from the Western hemisphere, but 42% of the remainder
comes from the Persian Gulf and Africa (although 10% is from Nigeria,
largely unaffected by the MENA protests).34 The EIA lists three shipping
chokepoints in the MENA alone (the Suez Canal, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the
Strait of Hormuz), which also impact international oil transport and
availability.35 Egyptian protests in January and February highlighted the
possibility of disruptions to oil and natural gas transport between the Red
Sea and the Mediterranean. Turmoil in Libya, a larger oil exporter than
Egypt, and Bahrain also increased concern in the oil markets, as a number
of U.S. companies are invested in Libya's oil production. Although Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait announced they would increase production to compensate for any loss from the Libyan disruption, some of the extra Saudi
oil is of lower quality than Libyan crude, which makes Saudi oil an imperfect substitute for lost Libyan production. Some European refineries are
not equipped to process lower quality crudes, which may result in damaging market competition for petroleum from Nigeria (which ranks seventh
among U.S. oil suppliers) and Azerbaijan.
The United States' biggest concern, however, remains the possibility of
the revolutionary movement spreading to other, larger petroleum producers in the region—specifically Saudi Arabia, which is the world's secondlargest producer (behind Russia). According to the Congressional
Research Service, "[i]n addition to its current output, as of the end of
41

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 3

Journal of Strategic Security

2010, Saudi Arabia also held about 80% of the world's spare oil production capacity—capacity that is now being used to offset supply disruptions
elsewhere."36 If the Arab Spring decided to truly bloom in Saudi Arabia,
market fears could potentially drive prices far higher. Finally, the security
situation in the Strait of Hormuz is also of concern. The Strait, located
between Iran and Oman, is used as a route for a third of global oil transport—any interruption could result in higher oil prices.37

Realism: Strategic Concerns over Democratic Ideals
Realism, which emphasizes the propensity for conflict between states and
their desire to maximize self-interest in the world system, provides us
with a clear and parsimonious theoretical explanation for the behavior of
the United States Government with regard to the recent MENA uprisings.38 Structural realism evaluates the world politics at the system level.
The unit of analysis is the state. The theory views international relations
as a competition for power between self-interested states, leading to a
generally pessimistic outlook on "the prospects for eliminating conflict
and war."39 It may be notable, then, that the United States has not been
more vocal in its disapproval of the democratic movements in the MidEast. This can be attributed either to the conflict between realism and
democratic ideals (like people, states do not always act out of purely rational self-interest) or to the fact that the MENA revolutions did not spread
to larger oil producers in the area.40
Even more germane to our particular inquiry, structural realism emphasizes the need for each state to focus on its own survival in an anarchic
world system. Waltz points out that states' actions can be explained by
examining the constraints under which they operate in international competition. Structural realism emphasizes that not merely military might,
but also energy security, is cause for concern, particularly for the United
States.41 States seek, at a minimum, their own survival, but at a maximum, universal domination. U.S. desire for, at the very least, our own
energy security, is a clear and rational cause of recent reluctance to support grass-roots democracy. The preference for keeping "our guys" in
power is self-evident.42
Wohlforth explains this with parsimony rivaling that of realist theory
itself. Realism is based on three key assumptions: groupism, egoism, and
power-centrism. Groupism dictates that people need group solidarity to
survive above subsistence level. In the modern world, the group level is
the state. Egoism holds that self-interest will inevitably win out over
altruism; power-centrism holds that power is the "fundamental feature of
42
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politics."43 An important element of power is control of resources—such
as energy. Key logical implications of these assumptions for our case
study are as follows: the state, and nationalism, will be a key feature of
politics; and state strategic interests will "trump any putatively universal
morality and ethics."44 Indeed, "realism suggests skepticism about the
ability of even the wisest states to promote democracy beyond their own
borders."45
Likewise, in keeping with the defensive realist theory of proponents such
as Waltz, the United States has not come to the rescue of the autocrats
removed from office as a result of the Arab Spring movement. While the
United States will undoubtedly face a complicated policy situation in the
Middle East as new regimes come to power, attempting to maximize its
own power in the region by blatantly manipulating the situation and aiding in the suppression of mass protests would be unwise—the international system would react unfavorably.46

Conclusion: Suggestions for Future Research
This paper has examined the recent Arab Spring in the Middle East and
North Africa and the American energy concerns pertinent to it. The key
puzzle was how to explain the lack of meaningful United States rhetoric in
support of the MENA reform movement. It was a particularly curious
conundrum given the freedoms on which our own country was founded.
The evaluation of the U.S. energy security situation and the U.S. MENA
relations demonstrated a connection between American energy security
concerns and American foreign relations in the MENA. At one point in the
beginning of 2011, oil prices jumped approximately eight percent in just a
few days due to fears that the chaos in Egypt would affect the two million
barrels per day that pass through the Suez Canal and the adjacent oil
pipeline. This was clearly of grave concern to American policymakers and
energy analysts.
This paper employed the theoretical approach of structural realism to further clarify and explain how energy security interests translated into
American policy toward the MENA during these historic revolutionary
efforts. As one of the most well-known theories of international relations,
structural realism offers a framework for evaluating the competing goals
of U.S. foreign policy and American democratic values. It provides a hierarchy of priorities. This hierarchy clearly shows that energy security is of
great importance in the larger structure of national security.
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This paper closes with some suggestions for future research. Scholars and
policymakers should investigate the special case of Libya. A study of U.S.
participation in the NATO intervention in Libya has the potential to provide additional clarification to this work on the U.S. response to the
regional revolutions overall. Analysts have suggested contradicting explanations as to whether aiding the Libyan rebels is for altruistic, humanitarian reasons, or whether it is a bid to more quickly restore stability to an
important producer—action for strategic purposes this time, instead of
inaction.47 Scholars have now begun to address U.S. and NATO participation in the Libyan revolution, but more work needs to be done. Research
clarifying America's foreign policy on Libya would contribute greatly to
the field. Additionally, the Syrian situation becomes more desperate by
the day. Academic analysis of the United States' reluctance to intervene
militarily in this matter would provide a valuable contribution to understanding the role that energy (in)security and democratic values play in
American foreign policy (in)action.
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